# Semis – Neg vs Florida LM

## 1NC

### 1

#### Aff’s not topical—not restrictions on production

Lothar Ehring (Assistant to Mr. Péter Balás, Deputy Director-General at the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission, responsible for multilateral affairs, as well as trade defence instruments and bilateral trade relations with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Until 2008, Lothar Ehring served in the Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade that is responsible for Legal Aspects of Trade Policy. He was the Coordinator for legal issues of multilateral trade, handled several WTO disputes and also represented the European Community in the negotiations on the reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) and Gian Franco Chinale 2011 “Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: Wto, Nafta and Energy Charter” p. 134-5

The perfect example to test and discuss this interpretation is the famous case of OPEC production quotas. These quotas. as implemented at the national levels of OPEC members, are horizontal **restrictions on production**. They limit exportation no more than domestic sales, and yet the argument is made time and again that they fall foul of Article XI:I of the GATT 1994.” The proponents of this thesis recognize that they are on thin ice. given that production limitations are as remote from being border measures as a restriction can possibly be. Equally clear is the fact that a production limitation definition does not discriminate against exports, neither de jure nor de facto. The proponents of the OPEC GATT-illegality attempt to overcome this conclusion with the argument that for some of the oil exporting countries in question, the near totality of the production goes to export. This. however, is **legally irrelevant** to the question of whether there is a discrimination against or higher burden on exports. The quantitative relationship between domestic consumption and exports can be very imbalanced for reasons of production and consumption capacities, in large part for reasons of a country’s size and the foreign demand for the product concerned. Also **the** conceptual **argument that a restriction on production can be decomposed into a restriction on exportation** as well a restriction on domestic sales **is not plausible.** The production restriction is precisely and inseparably both at the same time and this makes a qualitative difference that is impossible to set aside.

#### They’re only a regulation – that’s distinct

CJ Veeraswami (Former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, India) 1966 “T.M. Kannappa Mudaliar And Ors. vs The State Of Madras” Majority opinion,

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/838831/

The collection of a toll or a tax for the use of a road or for the use of a bridge or for the use of an aerodrome is no barrier or burden or deterrent to traders, who, in their absence, may have to take a longer or less convenient or more expensive route. Such compensatory taxes are no hindrance to anybody's freedom so long as they remain reasonable; but they could of course, be converted into a hindrance to the freedom of trade. If the authorities concerned really wanted to hamper anybody's trade they could easily raise the amount of tax or toll to an amount which would be prohibitive or deterrent or create other impediments which instead of facilitating trade and commerce would hamper them. It is here that the contrast, between 'freedom' (Article 301) and 'restrictions' (Articles 302 and 304) clearly appears; that which in reality facilitates trade and commerce is not a restriction, and that which in reality hampers or burdens trade and commerce is a restriction. It is the reality or substance of the matter that has to be determined. It is not possible apriori to draw a dividing line between that which would really be a charge for a facility provided and that which would really be a deterrent to a trade, but **the distinction**, if it has to be drawn **is real and clear**. For the tax to become a prohibited tax it has to be a direct tax the effect of which is to hinder the movement part of trade. So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory it cannot operate as a hindrance. 12. Subba Rao, J. as he then was, concurring with Das, J. took substantially the same view and observed (at page 1430);: The word ' freedom ' is not capable of precise definition, but it can be stated what would infringe or detract from the said freedom. Before a particular law can be said to infringe the said freedom, it must be ascertained whether the impugned provision operates as a restriction impeding the free movement of trade **or only** as **a regulation** facilitating the same. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good condition of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions;, for without it, the necessary lines of communication such as roads, waterways and airways, cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one....It is for the Court in a given case to decide whether a provision purporting to regulate trade is in fact a restriction on freedom. The further observations as to what was meant by Restrictions in Article 302 are (at page 1433): But **the more difficult question is, what does** the word **" restrictions " mean** in Article 302? The dictionary meaning of the word " restrict" is "to confine, bound, limit." Therefore any limitations placed upon the freedom is a restriction on that freedom. But the **limitation** must be real, direct and immediate, but not fanciful, indirect or remote....Of all the doctrines evolved in my view, the doctrine of ' direct and immediate effect' on the freedom would be a reasonable solvent to the difficult situation that might arise under our Constitution. If a law, whatever may have been its source, directly and immediately affects the free movement of trade, it would be restriction on the said freedom. But a law which may have only indirect and remote repercussions on the said freedom cannot be considered to be a restriction on it. 13. Subba Rao, J., as he then was summed up his views in the following words (at page 1436): The foregoing discussions may be summarised in the following propositions : (1) Article 301 declares a right of free movement of trade without any obstructions by way of barriers, inter-State or intra-State or other impediments operating as such barriers. (2) The said freedom is not impeded, but on the other hand, promoted by regulations creating conditions for the free movement of trade, such as, police regulations, provision for services, maintenance of roads, provision for aerodromes, wharfs, etc. with or without compensation. (3) Parliament may by law impose restrictions on such freedom in the public interest and the said law can be made by virtue of any entry with respect whereof Parliament has power to make a law. (4) The State also, in exercise of its legislative power, may impose similar restrictions, subject to the two conditions laid down in Article 304 (b) and subject to the Proviso mentioned therein. (5) Neither Parliament nor the State Legislature can make a law giving preference to one State over another or making discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry in the Lists, infringing the said freedom. (6) This ban is lifted in the case of Parliament for the purpose of dealing with situations arising out of scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India and also in the case of a State under Article 304 (h), subject to the conditions mentioned therein. And (7) the State can impose a non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from other States or the Union territory to which similar goods manufactured or produced in the State are subject. 14. It is thus well established that regulatory provisions which do not directly or immediately impede or burden the free movement of trade, commerce and intercourse but provide or intend to provide facilities for trade, commerce and intercourse are not restrictions within the meaning of Part XIII and are compatible with the freedom of trade declared by Article 301. Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam , and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan , are both cases of imposition of tax. The first was concerned with the Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954,, which was successfully attacked on the ground that it violated Article 301 and was not saved by Article 304 (b). The Act imposed a tax on specified goods transported by road or inland waterways in the State of Assam. The majority in that case held that the Act put a direct restriction on the freedom of trade and, since in doing so, had not complied with the provisions of Article 304 (b), it must be declared to be void. In the second case the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951, was impugned as violating Article 301. But the majority did not accept the contention on the view that the Act was merely a regulatory measure imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities. The scope of Article 301 was again in the light of the earlier decisions referred to in Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam , where the Assam Taxation (On goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act as amended after Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam , was attacked on various grounds but without success. 15. As already seen, **the distinction** between a restriction and a regulation **is fine but real**, though the dividing line is not capable in the nature of things of a comprehensive and satisfactory definition. The test, broadly speaking, is whether the impugned provisions lay a direct and immediate burden on the movement of trade, commerce and intercourse or are intrinsically beneficial to and provide, in the ultimate analysis, facilities for better conduct of trade, commerce and intercourse. Observed Das, J., in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground – removing trade barriers lets them avoid relevant production debates and counterplans, which guts the operative topical term and grants them unpredictable external offense and disad answers.

#### 2. Limits – border policy involves a separate lit base that makes it impossible to anticipate topic evolution. Domestic topics are already complex on enough levels that adding a new foreign policy sector makes it unmanageable.

### 2

#### The modern energy system traps us into the belief of a false euphoric future while overlooking how this same system dooms us to ecological destruction, resource wars, democratic authoritarianism and extinction

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 1-3]

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss ,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings-almost one-third of the planet's population-experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact-and sometimes exacerbated-social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smi l, 2003: 370- 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who ' early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner too c heap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, ctted tn the New York Ttmes 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the "magical fire" or the prolifera~ ion of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize "inherently safe reactors" (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in "sustainable energy alternatives" that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, "green" energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy "haves" and "havenots." 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291 ), "today's nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people" as "micropower meets village power." Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a "solar global economy ... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world's cultural diversity" (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (I 934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ... an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations ... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity-here are the enemies. The living organism demands ali fe-sustaining environment. Modernity's formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity's supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era's social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the "democratic authoritarian bargain" ( 1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce "every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority" **on the condition that society demands only what the regime is** capable and **willing to offer**. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford's work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### The aff’s fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail.

Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]

Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact **reproduce** a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the **legitimating moral gloss** of the **‘force for good’** rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and **sparking long-term trends of** rising crime rates, property **destruction**, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while **providing profits** for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the **active defence** of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based **system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions** and processes of global governance **does not work for billions of people or** for **planetary ecological systems**. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that **keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed.** 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a **growing consensus** that long-term stability, particularly the **reduction of violent conflict**, will require **far greater political**, economic and environmental equity **on a global scale**, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and **transform the** rules-based **system into a more equitable form**. A growing literature now argues that prevailing **western approaches to** understanding, managing and ameliorating global **insecurity** and its violent symptoms are **inadequate and unsustainable**. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate **significant** negativefeedback, or ‘blowback’, from **unintended outcomes** that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, **the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky**: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘**inevitably leads to a** loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process **with no end in sight**. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generatingnew and potentially more dangerous **risks** deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatresof conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the **erosion of civil liberties** and the **securitization of daily life.** There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could **generate more**, and potentially **more lethal, risks than it resolves** or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, **wholly counterproductive.** 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### Vote neg – must investigate epistemological underpinnings of energy production – alternative is a “growth at all costs” society that culminates in endless crises and oppression

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

All work on energy, society, and climate change may be divided into two broader theoretically significant categories based on its main underlying assumptions. On the one hand, there are sociologists whose proposals to solve global issues like climate change **involve tweaking the system** through policy, personal consumption choices, or technological change. On the other hand, you have sociologists **calling for** system-wide social and ecological change. In other words, some sociologists limit their studies to **changes that are possible** within the capitalist system, while others document the ways in which **capitalism is** incompatible **with** ecological and social **justice goals** and call for a **more significant transformation** of the world system.

One reason this central divide is so relevant to energy studies is that climate change has been **driven by the economic growth inherent to capitalism**. The key conflict that arises in climate negotiations, and which is constantly alluded to in environmental negotiations between nations, is that between ecological, social, and economic priorities (Clark and York 2005; Bazilian 2009; York 2010). Energy developments are **conditioned by these competing priorities**. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2008) puts the issue plainly: “Energy use is largely driven by economic growth.” Problems with energy developments are thus in large part problems of scale **related to the level of economic throughput**. And the scale of energy consumption remains coupled in capitalist economies with economic growth in spite of efficiency gains, as critical sociologists of energy have demonstrated (York 2010; York, et al. 2011). For this reason, energy debates, like other issues in environmental sociological theory, often **center on the tension between economic growth and ecological change**. There are striking differences in how this tension and the possibility of overcoming it are understood by various theoretical positions. The most influential approach to energy issues in the broader society and policy circles is mirrored in environmental sociology in the ecological modernization perspective. It is the most optimistic that the tension between economic growth and ecological change may be transcended (social justice is not integrated in their analysis.)

Ecological modernizationists emphasize “the possibility, actuality and desirability of a green Capitalism” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 23). They claim there is a “growing independence of ecological rationality vis-à-vis other (e.g. economic and political) rationalities” (22) in the governance of society and institutions. “The basic premise of ecological modernization theory is…[that there is a] centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social practices and institutions of modern society” (Mol 2002, 93). The authors see “continued industrial [and technological] development as offering **the best option for escaping from the ecological crises** of the developed world” (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001, 702). This new breed of modernizers suggest “we have entered a new industrial revolution, one of radical restructuring of production, consumption, state practices and political discourses along ecological lines” (Sonnenfield 2009, 372).

Ecological modernization began as “**essentially a political program**” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 18) and remains **geared toward** influencing policy (Mol, Sonnenfield, and Spaargaren 2009, 11). That this perspective **might be popular in a world where those in power suggest capitalism will solve the climate crisis** it created is not surprising. Ecological modernization theorists themselves have represented the significance of their ideas via the extent to which **they share the perspective of** those in power, and by the taming of the environmental movement, which was forced into an establishment mold (Spaargaren and Mol 2009, 72–75).

Though it integrates popular assumptions, the ecological modernization perspective actually **is in conflict with** over a hundred years **of sociological and ecological analyses** (starting with that of the classical theorists, like Marx and Weber, and early energy scholars developing the study thermodynamics). This insidious perspective also is in conflict with the founding principles of environmental sociology, based on the New Ecological Paradigm, which include “recognition of: (1) limits to growth, (2) nonanthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s balance, (4) untenability of exemptionalism, and (5) ecological crisis” (Foster 2012). Therefore, Foster (2012) refers to the ecological modernization perspective as the new exemptionalism and the third stage of denialism **hindering necessary and urgent scientific development and change**:

The third stage of denial has the look and feel of greater realism, but actually constitutes a more desperate and dangerous response. It admits that capitalism is the problem, but also **contends that capitalism is the solution**. This general approach emphasizes what is variously referred to as "sustainable capitalism," "natural capitalism," "climate capitalism," "green capitalism," etc. In this view we can continue down the same road of capital accumulation, mounting profits, and exponential economic growth -- while at the same time miraculously reducing our burdens on the planetary environment. It is business as usual, but with greater efficiency and greater accounting of environmental costs. (Foster 2011a)

Ecological modernization is a way then to **avoid** any significant challenge **to the status quo**. Because of this it **ignores the** seriousness **and** scale **of ecological degradation** (York and Rosa 2003), but also **the inequalities** necessarily embedded **in the social relations of capitalism**. There is no real gender, race, class, or any kind of social justice analysis there, **even if justice is mentioned in passing** in their work (usually in response previous criticisms).

Despite all of these problems, the penetration of the assumptions undergirding this perspective is clear in the sociology of energy and climate change. The conscious and unconscious adoption of the main tenets of the modernization framework stands out in the sociology articles published since the boom in climate change research starting in 2005. A key term search in Sociological Abstracts of the 1,734 peer-reviewed articles published since 2005 with “climate change” or “energy” in the title yields the following results: many more mention technology (424), technological change (96), alternative energy (110), or renewable energy (160) than mention energy conservation (120), economic growth (96), or capitalism (35). Shockingly, only 22 mention inequality and only 9 equality.

**The blinders imposed by** perspectives such as **ecological modernization** in the sociological work on energy and climate change, and broader environmental sociological theory, means that

environmental sociology today is therefore faced with a double challenge, emanating both from without and within: developing means to combat the planetary rift, and confronting the new exemptionalism, which threatens to overthrow environmental sociology as a critical tradition. With respect to the latter challenge, the problem is to be found **not in the concept of ecological modernization itself,** which is obviously useful in limited contexts, and reflects real-world processes, but rather the elevation of ecological modernization **into an overall environmental theory resurrecting the basic postulates of human exemptionalism**. (Foster 2012)

This makes the theoretical perspective proposed in this thesis all the more important **and** urgent, for the sociology of energy and for environmental sociology as a whole. Because the sociology of energy is taking off, **the climate crisis is only worsening, and** new scholars **are being trained en masse,** it is a crucial moment **in the theoretical development** of what will now be sustained sociological attention to energy. As bad as things are, they are only expected to get worse. Energy increasingly will be forced onto the broader sociological agenda (Dunlap 2010; Webler and Tuler 2010). **If energy justice is not** at the heart of the sociology of energy that takes root, our formulations will necessarily **impose blinders that make it** impossible to understand**, or** propose meaningful changes **to address, the interpenetrating depredations of social inequality and environmental destruction** associated with the modern energy regime.

### 3

#### There is no self – the aff attempts material domination through technology which kills value in existence – the prior question is reorienting our relationship towards technology

**Loy 3 –** card-carrying Buddhist

(David, *Technology and Cultural Values: on the edge of the third millennium*, pp.176-187, dml)

 According to Buddhism, this ego-self is illusory because it **corresponds to nothing substantial**: it is sunya, "empty". Instead of being separate from the world, my sense-of-self is one manifestation of it. In contemporary terms, the sense-of-self is an impermanent, because interdependent, construct. Furthermore, I think we are all at least dimly aware of this, for our lack of a more substantial, Cartesian-like self means that our ungrounded sense-of-self **is** haunted **by a profound insecurity which we can** never quite manage **to resolve**. We usually experience this insecurity as the feeling that "something is wrong with me", a feeling which we understand in different ways according to our particular character and situation. Contemporary culture conditions many of us into thinking that what is wrong with us is that we do not have enough money, or enough sex; academics, like aspiring Hollywood actors, are more likely to understand the problem as not being famous enough (not published enough, not read enough, etc.). But all these different ways of understanding our lack encourage the same trap: I try to ground myself and **make myself feel more real** **by** modifying **the world "outside" myself**. I try to subjectify myself by objectifying myself. Unfortunately, nothing in our notoriously-impermanent world can fill up the bottomless pit at the core of my being -- bottomless, because there is really no-thing to fill up. To put it another way, no amount of money or fame in the world can ever be enough if that is not what I really want.

According to Buddhism, such personal "reality projects" -- these ways we try to make ourselves feel more real -- **cannot be successful, for a very different approach is needed** to overcome our sense of lack. Instead of trying to ground ourselves somewhere on the "outside", we need to look "inside". Instead of **running away** from this sense of emptiness at our core, we need to become more comfortable with it and more aware of it, in which case it can transform from a sense of lack into the source of our creativity and spontaneity [Loy (1996)].

The above describes our individual problem. Now the big question: is the same thing true collectively? Can this shed any light on **our contemporary attitude toward technology?** Individually, we usually address the problem of our lack of self-grounding by trying to ground ourselves somewhere in the world -- e.g., in the size of our bank account or in the number of people who know our name. Are we collectively attempting to solve the problem of our collective lack of self-grounding in a similar fashion, by trying to ground ourselves in the world? In this case, **by** objectifying **and** transforming **the world technologically?**

Technology is not applied science. It **is the expression of a deep longing,** an original longing that is present in modern science from its beginning. This is the desire of the self to seek its own truth through the mastery of the object... The power of technique is not to connect thought effectively to nature; **it alters nature to its own purpose**. Its aim is to master its being; to own it. [Verene: 107]

What is that deep longing? Remember the problem of life-meaning that, I have suggested, motivates (or contributes to) our dualism between nature and culture/technology. Despite their material insecurity, most premodern societies are quite secure in another way: for such people, the meaning of their lives is determined for them, for better and worse. From our perspective they may be "stuck," but insofar as they do not know of any alternative they are able to enjoy themselves as much as their situation allows. In contrast, our freedom to determine the meaning of our lives, and the direction of our own societies, means we have lost such security due to the lack of any such "natural" ground for us. In compensation, has technological development **become our collective security project?**

Today we have become so familiar with rapid scientific and technological development that **we have come to think of it as natural,** which in this case means: something that does not need to be explained. But in what sense is it natural to "progress" from the Wright brothers' biplane to a moon-landing within one lifetime? (Bertrand Russell was already an adult when the Wright Brothers first flew; he lived long enough to watch the first moon-landing on television.) In response to the anxiety produced by our alienation from a more original type of "natural" condition, **we try to make ourselves feel more real by** reorganizing **the whole world until we can see our own image reflected in it everywhere**, in the "resources" with which we try to secure and manipulate the material conditions of our existence.

This is why so many of us have been able to dispense with the consolations of traditional religion: now we have other ways to control our fate, or at least try to. But we must also understand how that impels us: because the traditional security provided by religious meaning -- grounding us in God, etc. -- has been taken away from us, we have not been able to escape the task of trying to construct our own self-ground. According to Mahayana Buddhism, however, such projects **are doomed from the start**, for nothing can have self-existence: that everything interpenetrates everything else means that all things are composed of "non-self" elements -- an important truth for a species so wholly dependent on its deteriorating physical environment.

The result is that no amount of material security ("resources") can provide the kind of grounding we crave, the sense of reality we most need -- a need which is best understood as spiritual, for that helps us to see the fundamental contradiction that defeats us. Unfortunately, **we cannot manipulate the natural world** in a collective attempt to self-ground ourselves, and then also hope to find in that world a ground greater than ourselves. Our incredible technological power means we can do almost anything we want, yet the ironic consequence is that **we no longer know what we want to do**. Our reaction to this has been to grow and "develop" ever more quickly, but to what end? ... To keep evading these deepest questions about the meaning of our lives, one suspects. Our preoccupation with the means (the whole earth as "resources") means we perpetually postpone thinking about ends: where are we all going so fast? Or are we running so fast because we are trying to get away from something?

Another way to put it is that our technology **has become our attempt to own the universe**, an attempt that is always frustrated because, for reasons we do not quite understand, we never possess it fully enough to feel secure in our ownership. For many people dubious of this project, Nature has taken over the role of a more transcendental God, because like God it can fulfill our need to be grounded in something greater than we are; our technology cannot fill that role, because it is motivated by the opposite response, attempting to banish all such sacrality by extending our control. Our success in "improving" nature means we can no longer rest peacefully in its bosom.

Yet there seems to be a problem with this "lack" approach: doesn't it smear all technological development with the same Buddhist brush? Instead of deconstructing the nature vs. technology duality, doesn't such a perspective risk falling into the same pro-nature, anti-progress attitude that was questioned earlier?

In response, it is necessary to emphasize that **this approach** does not imply **any wholesale rejection of modern technology**. Remember that the Buddhist emphasis is on **our motivations.** This does not necessarily mean that any particular technology is bad in itself, insofar as **it is our problematic and confused negative motivations** that tend to lead to negative consequences. This allows us to **evaluate** specific situations by applying a Buddhist rule-of-thumb: is our interest in developing this new technology due to our greed or ill-will; and -- applying the third criterion of ignorance or delusion -- can we become clear about why we are doing this? Among other things, this means: do we clearly understand how this will reduce dukkha, and what its other effects will be?

Such questions encourage us, in effect, **to transform our motivations**, in a way that would enable us to evaluate technologies **in a more** conscious **and** thoughtful **fashion**. One crucial issue in this process, of course, is who the "we" is. Transformative technologies have often been initiated **without much thought of their long-range consequences** (e.g., automobiles), but sometimes they have been imposed by elites with a firm belief in their superior understanding (e.g., nuclear power). The evaluation process I am suggesting would involve engaging in a much more thorough and wide-ranging democratic discussion of what we collectively want from a technology. This will not stop us from making mistakes, but at least **they will be our collective mistakes**, rather than those of elites that may have more to gain and less to lose than the rest of us. Also, this will **inevitably slow down** the development of new technologies, something I see as usually being not a disadvantage but an advantage because it will allow for a more painstaking scientific and sociological evaluation less subverted by desire for profit or competitive advantage.

#### Vote negative to break the shackles of the ego through embracing its annihilation

**Perreira 10 –** Ph.D. candidate at UC Santa Barbara

(Todd LeRoy, ““Die before you die”: Death Meditation as Spiritual Technology of the Self in Islam and Buddhism”, The Muslim World Vol 100, Issue 2-3, 247-267, dml)

In Theravada Buddhism, death (marana ) is understood simply as the “interruption of the life faculty included within [the limits of] a single becoming (existence).” Buddhism distinguishes between two types of death: timely and untimely. A death determined by the “exhaustion of merit or the exhaustion of the life span” is considered a timely death whereas a death determined by “kamma (Skt. karma) that interrupts [other, life-producing] kamma” is regarded as an untimely death. 52 Human birth and death are, like all other phenomena, subjected to an impersonal principal of causation known as paticca samuppada - ¯ , “dependent origination.” Buddhism regards the idea of a permanent soul or atta (Skt. a¯tman) as a mental projection which has no corresponding reality and, as such, **is dangerous for it leads to false notions of “me” and “mine.**” The view that the self has an inner essence or eternal soul is nurtured on what are called the “three poisons” — greed, hatred, and delusion, around which the wheel of birth and death (samsara ¯ ) turns. According to the Buddha’s analysis what, by convention, is called the “self” is, in fact, constituted by the congeries of ﬁve aggregates or khandhas (matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) which, in relation to paticca samuppada - ¯ or the law of cause and effect, are inherently impermanent. This explains why corpse meditation has long been, and continues to be, a practice vital to Buddhism: “For all its grave stillness **there is nothing more dynamic than a corpse**.” 53 It is the event of impermanence taking place before the eyes of the meditator. The corpse therefore serves as the ideal object lesson: **to “die” before you die is to die to false notions of an enduring self**. In spite of these two radically different perspectives both Islam and Buddhism agree that **the central human predicament is** not death but the unsatisfactoriness **that results from our identiﬁcation with a self** that hankers for the things of this world. According to al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯ the cause of this dissatisfaction is rooted in ignorance due to: (1) lengthy hopes and (2) desire for the things of this world. By lengthy hopes he means we generally go about our lives under the pretext that we can expect to enjoy a long and healthy life. To maintain this fantasy, **we plunge ourselves into the pursuit** of pleasure, wealth, and prestige and, in the process, become so “engrossed” **we fail to recognize how brief and ephemeral these frivolities are** in actuality. The Buddha offered an analogous perspective. The term he designated for the unsatisfactoriness of life is dukkha or suffering and it conveys a similar notion in that its cause is attributed to a thirsting or craving (tanha ) for sense pleasures that ultimately entrap us in the rounds of birth and death. And, as in Suﬁsm, it is the failure to penetrate the veil of ignorance (avijja¯) that keeps us from knowing the true nature of the self. Whether it is a question of gaining insight into the insubstantial nature of the “self ” (anatta), as in the case of the Buddhism, or, a need to effect a decisive break with that aspect of the “self ” (nafs) “engrossed” in worldly affairs and lengthy hopes as we ﬁnd in Suﬁsm, what is apparent in both traditions is that the experience of dying before dying seems to introduce two new forms of experience which were previously absent. The ﬁrst — that of introspection — **appears to be linked to a new knowledge of how one/I/you/we should live our lives** while the other is primarily one of interrogation — **the minute level of scrutiny required of one who goes to battle with his[/her] own demons**. This occurs at the very moment in al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯’s spiritual biography when, for the ﬁrst time, he conducts an examination of his motives for teaching and it culminates in the anxiety attack that robs him of the ability to speak in the lecture hall. In the case of Ajahn Chah this process of introspection and interrogation takes the form of an internal dialogue, one that is not willed but arises spontaneously at the moment he is seized with terror to the point of paralysis and is forced to confront the basis for his fears of death. In both cases, and this is signiﬁcant, each man temporarily loses the ability to control his external voice and, in the process, gains a new possibility for giving space over in his life to the authority of an interior voice. Thus, to access this new ﬁeld of experience one **must be willing to submit to a practice of “dying**” to those aspects of the self that otherwise stand in the way of spiritual development. There is also the possibility that **an intimate knowledge of death and dying may**, in fact, be an important vector **through which notions of the ethical life are transmitted** within the boundaries and parameters of a given tradition. If this is the case, if dying before dying **contributes to the formation of oneself as an ethical subject**, if it is generative of experiencing or imagining a new sense subjectivity, or at least new possibilities for reforming the old sense of self, then it appears to be **a process of identity formation that is both morally compelling and expansive**. By “dying” one rehearses, as it were, a role inscribed in the narrative ethics transmitted and performed by countless virtuosi through the ages. We saw how the ordination procedure of a new monk, together with his ﬁrst instruction in meditation, reenacts the Buddha’s response to his own confrontation with death by choosing to go forth with the Great Renunciation. Al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯’s ethical interiorization begins with his recognition that God, through the call of the inner voice beckoning him to take to the road, compelled him to renounce (i.e., “die”) to his attachment to a comfortable teaching post in what was then one of the most prestigious centers of learning in the world. New research into his life suggests this decision to turn away from the comforts of worldly life toward a life of “seclusion” (‘uzla) may also have been prompted by reports about the life of the Prophet Muhammad and about al-Ash‘arı¯, who, like other ﬁgures of Islam, had a life-changing experience at the age of forty. 54 Because turning one’s life around at age forty is a recurring motif in Muslim biographies, if true, this would conﬁrm that his decision to abandon his teaching post and embrace a mystical path of seclusion can also be understood in terms of Flood’s idea of asceticism, that is, as the “internalizing of tradition” and the shaping of the narrative of one’s life in accordance with the narrative of tradition. 55

#### That outweighs

**Lanza, ‘09** (Robert Lanza is considered one of the leading scientists in the world. He is currently Chief Scientific Officer at Advanced Cell Technology, and a professor at Wake Forest University School of Medicine. "Does Death Exist? New Theory Says 'No'", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-lanza/does-death-exist-new-theo\_b\_384515.html)

Many of us fear death. We believe in death because we have been told we will die. We associate ourselves with the body, and we know that bodies die. But a new scientific theory suggests that death is not the terminal event we think. One well-known aspect of quantum physics is that certain observations cannot be predicted absolutely. Instead, there is a range of possible observations each with a different probability. One mainstream explanation, the "many-worlds" interpretation, states that each of these possible observations corresponds to a different universe (the 'multiverse'). A new scientific theory - called biocentrism - refines these ideas. There are an infinite number of universes, and everything that could possibly happen occurs in some universe. Death does not exist in any real sense in these scenarios. All possible universes exist simultaneously, regardless of what happens in any of them. Although individual bodies are destined to self-destruct, the alive feeling - the 'Who am I?'- is just a 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain. But this energy doesn't go away at death. One of the surest axioms of science is that energy never dies; it can neither be created nor destroyed. But does this energy transcend from one world to the other?

### econ

#### CCP will peacefully dissolve—otherwise the impact is inevitable

**Jianfeng, 12**

(Li, Epoch Times writer, September, 14, “The Instability of China’s Authoritarian Regime,” http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/opinion/the-instability-of-chinas-authoritarian-regime-292354.html)

Some worry that if the CCP were to collapse it would lead to large-scale unrest. But in view of China’s current situation, I believe that will not occur. There are three main reasons: ¶ One, China’s instability originates from the CCP’s own internal problems and manifests as the CCP’s internal struggles, rather than coming from outside factors. ¶ Two, the Chinese people themselves have never made a single destabilizing move. Petitions and mass incidents are merely self-protective grassroots acts allowed within the law. The CCP has lost people’s support since its corrupt, dictatorial nature has been totally exposed, and has incurred the people’s widespread opposition. This is the biggest crisis the CCP is facing in 60 years. Some people have summarized it as “a crisis of legitimacy of the CCP’s ruling authority.” ¶ Three, since the 2004 publication of the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party, an editorial series by The Epoch Times, there has been a surging tide of Chinese nationals quitting from the CCP. This has paved the way to **dissolve the CCP peacefully**, and has created a transition to a peaceful and democratic society. When Chinese people abandon the CCP from their hearts, a period without the CCP will peacefully arrive.

#### No impact to the Chinese economy and the response measures check

Coonan 08 (10/25, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe worried,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html)

All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn*.* The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold*.* It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.

#### Normal deterrence applies—China knows Japan is way stronger

**Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 97** (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, doctoral candidates in political science at MIT. Harvey Sapolsky, professor of public policy at MIT. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. Spring 1997)

Current US strategy implicitly assumes that America must remain engaged because of the Asian countries' failure to balance against Chinese strength. But Japan and Taiwan, the two plausible targets for Chinese aggression, are more than capable of defending themselves from conventional attack. Both enjoy the geographic advantage of being islands. The surrounding oceans ensure a defense dominance that could only be overcome with enormous material or technological advantages. The amphibious operations required for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or Japan would be extremely difficult and at a minimum would require substantial investment in amphibious warfare capability. Taiwan could extract a withering toll on invading forces. Its air force is large, sophisticated, and growing; its navy has deadly missile boats; and it produces anti-ship cruise missiles. The same Taiwanese forces would make a Chinese blockade of Taiwan even harder. China would find it difficult to harass Taiwanese ports on the eastern side of the island with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.41 Chinese attacks on shipping would be blocked by Taiwan's air superiority and sea control, and Chinese blockading forces would find it difficult to cover the wide swath of ocean around Taiwan, China could use its ballistic missile force to conduct terror attacks against Taiwanese targets, but terror attacks have negligible military or long-run political effects-witness the failures of the German Blitz and of the sustained IRA bombing campaign against the United Kingdom. As long as Taiwan has access to advanced Western weapons, it will be able to defend itself, Japan's threat environment is even more benign. Its "moat" is wider than the Taiwan Strait. Japan's large, sophisticated air and naval forces give it great defensive capabilities, and air and naval warfare play directly to Japan’s technological advantage. The side with the best sensors can target the enemy first, gaining an enormous advantage; empirical evidence suggests that the better trained or technologically superior air force can achieve favorable exchange ratios of 10:1 or greater. Japan's east-coast ports would make a blockade with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles technically impossible and would increase the area of coverage for blockading forces beyond the reasonable limits of any non-American navy's sustainment capability. Finally, anti-submarine warfare capability is a particular strength of the Japanese armed forces because of the Cold War mission for which they were designed.

### russia

#### Too late to solve—Russia no longer trusts anything we do

**Cohen, 2/28/12** [Professor, Russian Studies at New York University, America's Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-f-cohen/us-russia-policy_b_1307727.html?ref=politics&ir=Politics>]

In short, the United States is farther from a partnership with Russia today than it was more than twenty years ago.

Third: Who, it must be asked, is to blame for this historic failure to establish a partnership between America and post-Soviet Russia? In the United States, Moscow alone is almost universally blamed. The facts are different. There have been three compelling opportunities to establish such a partnership. All three were lost, or are being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.

- The first opportunity was following the end of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s. Instead, the Clinton administration adopted an aggressive triumphalist approach to Moscow. That administration tried to dictate Russia's post-Communist development and to turn it into a U.S. client state. It moved the U.S.-led military alliance, NATO, into Russia's former security zone. It bombed Moscow's remaining European ally, Serbia. And along the way, the Clinton administration broke strategic promises made to Moscow.

- The second opportunity for partnership was after 9/11, when the Bush administration repaid Russian President Vladimir Putin's extraordinary assistance in the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan by further expanding NATO to Russia's borders and by unilaterally withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the linchpin of its nuclear security.

- Now, since 2008, the Obama administration is squandering the third opportunity, its own "re-set," by refusing to respond to Moscow's concessions on Afghanistan and Iran with reciprocal agreements on Russia's top priorities, NATO expansion and missile defense.

In short, every opportunity for a U.S.-Russian partnership during the past twenty years was lost, or is being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.

Fourth: How to explain, we must also ask, such unwise U.S. policies over such a long period? The primary explanation is a policy-making outlook, or ideology, that has combined the worst legacy of the Cold War with the worst American reaction to the end of the Soviet Union.

- Washington's two most consequential (and detrimental) decisions regarding post-Soviet Russia have **continued the militarized approach** of the Cold War: to move NATO eastward; and to build missile defense installations near Russia's borders.

- At the same time, Washington's triumphalist reaction to the end of the Soviet state produced a winner-take-all diplomatic approach that has been almost as aggressive. Consider the three primary components of this so-called diplomacy:

1. Presumably on the assumption that Russia's interests abroad are less legitimate than America's, Washington has acted on a double-standard in relations with Moscow. The unmistakable example is that while creating a vast U.S.-NATO sphere of military and political influence around Russia, Washington adamantly denounces Moscow's quest for any zone of security, even on its own borders.

2. Similarly, U.S. negotiations on vital issues have been based on the premise (called "selective cooperation") that Moscow should make all major concessions while Washington makes none. And on rare occasions when Washington did promise major concessions, it reneged on them, NATO's eastward expansion being only the first instance. (Can anyone who doubts this generalization cite a single meaningful concession -- any substantive reciprocity -- that Moscow has actually gotten from the United States since 1992?)

3. Meanwhile, presumably on the assumption that Russia's political sovereignty at home is less than our own, Washington has pursued intrusive "democracy-promotion" measures that flagrantly trespass on Moscow's internal affairs. This practice began in the 1990s with actual directives from Washington to Moscow ministries and with legions of onsite U.S. "advisers" and it continues today -- recently, for example, with the American vice president lobbying in Moscow against Putin's return to the Russian presidency and with the new U.S. ambassador's profoundly ill-timed meeting with leaders of Moscow's street protests.

In short, blaming Putin for anti-Americanism in Russia, as the U.S. State Department and media do, ignores the real cause: Twenty years of American military and diplomatic policies have convinced a large part of **Russia's political class** (and intelligentsia) that Washington's intentions are aggressive, aggrandizing and deceitful -- anything but those of a partner. (In that context, part of the Russian elite has criticized Putin for being "pro-American.")

#### Relations are impossible and won’t result in cooperation

**LaFranchi, 3/3/12** [Christian Science Monitor, “A cold-war chill US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria/%28page%29/2]

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men."

Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East.

Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests?

Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people.

Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and **diverging** international **visions**.

Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills.

The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further.

"I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says.

Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level.

"Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington.

Three years ago this month, President Obama said he **hoped to promote** more **cooperation** between the U.S. and Russia. It would be hard to see how that may happen as Vladimir Putin approaches power once again. Host Scott Simon speaks with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, about Sunday's elections in Russia.

#### No impact to Syria

**Young 8/11**/11 – opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut and author of The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle (Michael, "Assad's overreach pushes former allies into a corner" The National, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/assads-overreach-pushes-former-allies-into-a-corner?pageCount=2)

More prosaically, the Saudis and their Gulf partners, like Turkey, have plainly concluded that the policies pursued by the Assad regime are not only failing, they are heightening regional volatility in dangerous ways. The Syrian leader was quietly given time and room to put his house in order, but couldn't deliver. This now permits Saudi Arabia to review its options and look at how it might use Mr Al Assad's exit to its own advantage. Turkey has taken a more roundabout path to the same conclusion. Before the Turkish elections, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was highly critical of the Assad regime's behaviour, particularly after the military campaign in Idlib province that forced thousands of Syrians to flee into Turkey. At the same time the Turks are said to have proposed that the defence minister, Gen Ali Habib, an Alawite, head a transitional committee after Mr Al Assad's departure. This was turned down by the Assads. The general's dismissal on Monday, a day before Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu arrived in Damascus to deliver a rebuke to the Syrian president, could have been an irrevocable rejection of the Turkish plan - a way of saying that it's either the Assads or chaos. Now Turkey is bracing for the repercussions. Mr Davutoglu left Damascus moderately optimistic that Mr Al Assad would implement reforms, but the absence of specifics was worrying. Thousands of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey and the Assad regime's tactics make it more likely that Syria will dissolve into ethnic-sectarian conflict. Fragmentation might lead to de facto autonomy for Syria's Kurds, which could affect Turkey's Kurdish community. Moreover, in the event of civil war, Alawites in Turkey's Hatay province might demand intervention on behalf of their Syrian brethren. With the regional doors slamming shut, the options are narrowing for Mr Al Assad. There is no military answer to his regime's problems. Even the method the Syrians have traditionally adopted to protect themselves, namely **wreaking havoc in their neighbourhood** to negotiate advantageous resolutions, **has been virtually neutralised.** Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki has backed the Assad regime, fearing the emergence of a Sunni-dominated Syria to Iraq's west; while Lebanon, a perennial outlet for Syrian power games, is governed by a coalition sympathetic to Mr Al Assad. Syria can convey limited warnings through both countries, but cannot readily subvert their civil peace.

#### No escalation

**Salem 12/2** – director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon (Paul, “The Next Move for Syria” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/02/next-move-for-syria/80c7)

What is happening in Syria? The crisis in Syria has reached a critical point. The persistent and powerful uprising is nine months old and dispersed throughout much of the country, into many rural and suburban areas, and in some of the smaller cities as well. It has produced a Syrian National Council, which is largely from outside Syria, and there is also a coordination committee inside Syria. Most of the uprising is peaceful but some groups are becoming armed. There’s also the emergence of the Free Syrian Army, which is a group of former army officers using arms in the rebellion. The regime has stood firm against this uprising and has been very tough and very brutal in the way it has dealt with protesters. But unlike regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, it has not had major defections or major cracks yet. So it’s a strong and tough uprising and a strong and tough regime at the same time. In a sense, there is a bit of a balance of power. But time is moving against the regime because with the passage of time, the economy—which is already in very desperate straits—is under ever further pressure. Syria’s environment, regionally and internationally, has also become increasingly hostile. Syria had many more friends before this started but it has lost most of them. So the regime, although it is still tough and fighting hard and it still has friends in Iran, Iraq, and in Hezbollah in Lebanon, seems to be on a downward gradient. Is this the start of a civil war in Syria? I would describe the situation not as a civil war but as a fight between a regime and many parts of its own population. Even the peaceful protesters have been met with violence. Of course there are some elements of the uprising that are becoming armed—those too are being met with violence. If, however, the regime collapses and Syria divides into rival communities—perhaps on a sectarian basis, similar to what happened in Iraq and in Lebanon—then we could have a civil war. While there is some risk of that, the regime is exaggerating that risk or looking to escalate such a risk because it is the alternative to a civil war. If the state completely collapses—as it did in a sense in Iraq and in Lebanon—there might be a brief period of civil war and sectarian or other forms of violence. But unlike Iraq and Lebanon, there isn’t a balance of power among communities in Syria to have a drawn out civil war. If it comes to that, the Arab Sunni majority in Syria is so overwhelming—70 percent and it’s in all the big cities—that Syria, in a sense, cannot have a civil war. At the end of the day, there is a clear majority, and if it comes to that then that voice will be dominant. So there’s a risk of a violent transition and a difficult transitional period, but I don’t think descent into long-term civil war is possible in Syria.

### trade

**Removing tariffs kills the market**

**Hart and Gordon 12** \*Melanie Hart is a Policy Analyst on China Energy and Climate Policy at the Center for American Progress. Kate Gordon is Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/03/15/11330/the-complexities-of-the-u-s-decision-on-chinese-solar-panel-imports/, The Complexities of the U.S. Decision on Chinese Solar Panel Imports, March 15th]

Whether the U.S. solar market [continues to grow](http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-03-14/solar-wind-energy/53517526/1), therefore, may depend much more on demand-side policies than on access to cheap Chinese imports. Overall, then, it is not clear that import tariffs would harm solar-market growth in the United States over the long term. What is clear, however, is that long-term U.S. market exposure to illegal subsidization certainly would not only harm solar-panel manufacturers but possibly also slow growth across the value chain. Chinese leaders look at the United States and want what we have. They [want to become](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/news/2011/08/24/10128/china-eyes-competitive-edge-in-renewable-energy/) a global research and development powerhouse that creates and exports cutting edge technologies with big profit margins. China’s traditional command-and-control economic system was not good at creating those innovation incentives, so they are working to reform that system, but reform takes time. In the meantime they are trying to fill the gap with heavy government subsidies. Problem is, that approach can actually reduce innovation, not only in China, but also in the United States. Bureaucrats are not adept at picking winning companies and winning technology standards. When Chinese officials heavily subsidize their favorite domestic solar manufacturers, those subsidies can reduce prices to levels that other firms cannot match, thus driving competitors out of the market and reducing incentives for innovation. When China exports those products to the United States, the same dynamic can play out here. The long-term result is that a small number of heavily subsidized Chinese manufacturers could dominate the global solar market. That may make Chinese leaders happy, but if those firms are not producing the best solar technologies—for example, if their solar panels are not as efficient as they need to be to compete with traditional fossil fuels—that can slow solar-market development worldwide. To keep this market growing, the best thing the U.S. government can do is to create a good environment for technology innovation, and that will require a combination of demand-side policies and protection from adverse price incentives.

**No impact – the ruling wont stymie the industry – disruptions are at best temporary**

**Woody, 12** [Todd, Solar Installers Caught In Cross Fire Of Escalating China Trade War, Forbes Staff, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddwoody/2012/05/18/solar-installers-caught-in-cross-fire-of-escalating-china-trade-war/>]

**Will the booming** U.S. **solar installation industry become collateral damage** **in the** growing **solar trade war with China**?¶ On Thursday, the U.S. **Commerce** Department **issued a** [preliminary **decision levying steep tariffs**](http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-ad-prelim-20120517.pdf) **against Chinese** **solar manufacturers**, finding they illegally dumped cheap photovoltaic cells on the American market. But the companies that install those solar panels on residential and commercial rooftops – and which have benefited from a 75% plunge in photovoltaic prices in recent years – are split over the impact of the tariffs on their burgeoning business.¶ “**I don’t think this ruling will stymie the industry**,” **says** Danny **Kennedy**, **president of Sungevity**, an [Oakland](http://www.forbes.com/places/ca/oakland/), Calif.-based residential solar installer **that has rapidly expanded to the other states and countries over the past two years. “Lower cost affordable solar is the goal here and while this is unfortunate trade politicking I don’t think the sky is falling**.”¶ Sungevity obtains panels from China’s Suntech and other suppliers. “It’s not a big proportion; it’s a mix,” Kennedy says of his Chinese supply chain. “**This is a market where you have supply-demand imbalance and we’re confident that cost curve will continue to come down**.”¶ Susan Wise, a spokeswoman for another big solar installer, [San Francisco](http://www.forbes.com/places/ca/san-francisco/)-based SunRun, was less optimistic. “If finalized, this decision would move us backward in the effort to make solar affordable for Americans,” Wise said in an e-mail. “It would make prices higher at the exact moment when solar power is starting to become competitive with fossil fuels in more markets.”¶ Like most U.S. solar installers, Silicon Valley’s SolarCity uses Chinese-made photovoltaic panels. “Artificial cost increases designed to help a handful of companies at the expense of thousands of others in all fifty states simply don’t make sense,” Jonathan Bass, a SolarCity spokesman, said in an e-mail, noting his company employs 1,800 workers in a dozen states. “We make American-made panels available to any customer that prefers them.”¶ **The solar trade war**, which flared after the U.S. subsidiary of Germany’s SolarWorld filed an unfair trade complaint with the federal government, **is far from over** and a final decision is not expected until Nov. 23. SolarWorld and six other companies argued that the Chinese government unfairly subsidizes its domestic industry with cheap loans from state banks, favorable real estate deals and other incentives.¶ On Thursday, the Commerce Department hit Suntech, one of China’s biggest photovoltaic cell makers with a 31.22% tariff and found that Trina, Yingli and other Chinese manufacturers that have captured a significant share of the U.S. market should pay a 31.18% tariff. In 2011, Chinese companies exported $3.1 billion of solar cells to the U.S., according to the Commerce Department, which concluded that those manufacturers sold their products in the U.S. “for less than fair value.”¶ While SolarWorld and its allies hailed the tariffs as creating a more level playing field for the industry, some Chinese manufacturers characterized the Commerce Department as out of touch with the realities of the global solar market.¶ “As a global company with global supply chains and manufacturing facilities in three countries, including the United States, we are providing our U.S. customers with hundreds of megawatts of quality solar products that are not subject to these tariffs,” Andrew Beebe, Suntech’s San Francisco-based chief commercial officer, said in a statement Thursday.¶ Shayle Kann, vice president of research at GTM Research, says he expects other Chinese solar manufacturers to build factories overseas to avoid the tariffs.¶ “**We think there will be some short-term disruption in the supply chain in the U.S. as installers figure out what they can and cannot procure, and as suppliers determine their strategies to deal with the tariffs**,” Kann said an e-mail from China, where he is attending a solar trade show. “**So while there may be a near-term impact on demand, we continue to anticipate substantial growth in the U.S. market this year and moving forward. We’re currently forecasting 75% installation growth in 2012, down from 109% in 2011.”**

#### No nuclear terror—we cite better experts

**Pinker, 11** [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

Though conventional terrorism, as John Kerry gaffed, is a nuisance to be policed rather than a threat to the fabric of life, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction would be something else entirely. The prospect of an attack that would kill millions of people is not just theoretically possible but consistent with the statistics of terrorism. The computer scientists Aaron Clauset and Maxwell Young and the political scientist Kristian Gleditsch plotted the death tolls of eleven thousand terrorist attacks on log-log paper and saw them fall into a neat straight line.261 Terrorist attacks obey a power-law distribution, which means they are generated by mechanisms that make extreme events unlikely, but not astronomically unlikely. The trio suggested a simple model that is a bit like the one that Jean-Baptiste Michel and I proposed for wars, invoking nothing fancier than a combination of exponentials. As terrorists invest more time into plotting their attack, the death toll can go up exponentially: a plot that takes twice as long to plan can kill, say, four times as many people. To be concrete, an attack by a single suicide bomber, which usually kills in the single digits, can be planned in a few days or weeks. The 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed around two hundred, took six months to plan, and 9/11, which killed three thousand, took two years.262 But **terrorists live on borrowed time**: every day that a plot drags on brings the possibility that it will be disrupted, aborted, or executed prematurely. If the probability is constant, the plot durations will be distributed exponentially. (Cronin, recall, showed that terrorist organizations drop like flies over time, falling into an exponential curve.) Combine exponentially growing damage with an exponentially shrinking chance of success, and you get a power law, with its disconcertingly thick tail. Given the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the real world, and religious fanatics willing to wreak untold damage for a higher cause, a lengthy conspiracy producing a horrendous death toll is within the realm of thinkable probabilities. A statistical model, of course, is not a crystal ball. **Even if we could extrapolate** the line of existing data points, the massive terrorist attacks in the tail are still **extremely** (albeit not astronomically) **unlikely**. More to the point, we *can’t* extrapolate it. In practice, as you get to the tail of a power-law distribution, the data points start to misbehave, scattering around the line or warping it downward to very low probabilities. The statistical spectrum of terrorist damage reminds us not to dismiss the worst-case scenarios, but it doesn’t tell us how likely they are. So how likely are they? What do you think the chances are that within the next five years each of the following scenarios will take place? (1) One of the heads of state of a major developed country will be assassinated. (2) A nuclear weapon will be set off in a war or act of terrorism. (3) Venezuela and Cuba will join forces and sponsor Marxist insurrection movements in one or more Latin American countries. (4) Iran will provide nuclear weapons to a terrorist group that will use one of them against Israel or the United States. (5) France will give up its nuclear arsenal. I gave fifteen of these scenarios to 177 Internet users on a single Web page and asked them to estimate the probability of each. The median estimate that a nuclear bomb would be set off (scenario 2) was 0.20; the median estimate that a nuclear bomb would be set off in the United States or Israel by a terrorist group that obtained it from Iran (scenario 4) was 0.25. About half the respondents judged that the second scenario was more likely than the first. And in doing so, they committed an elementary blunder in the mathematics of probability. The probability of a conjunction of events (A and B both occurring) cannot be greater than the probability of either of them occurring alone. The probability that you will draw a red jack has to be lower than the probability that you will draw a jack, because some jacks you might draw are not red. Yet Tversky and Kahneman have shown that most people, including statisticians and medical researchers, commonly make the error.263 Consider the case of Bill, a thirty-four-year-old man who is intelligent but also unimaginative, compulsive, and rather dull. In school he was strong in mathematics but undistinguished in the arts and humanities. What are the chances that Bill plays jazz saxophone? What are the chances that he is an accountant who plays jazz saxophone? Many people give higher odds to the second possibility, but the choice is nonsensical, because there are fewer saxophone-playing accountants than there are saxophone players. In judging probabilities, people rely on the vividness of their imaginations rather than thinking through the laws. Bill fits the stereotype of an accountant but not of a saxophonist, and our intuitions go with the stereotype. The conjunction fallacy, as psychologists call it, infects many kinds of reasoning. Juries are more likely to believe that a man with shady business dealings killed an employee to prevent him from talking to the police than to believe that he killed the employee. (Trial lawyers thrive on this fallacy, adding conjectural details to a scenario to make it more vivid to a jury, even though every additional detail, mathematically speaking, ought to make it *less* probable.) Professional forecasters give higher odds to an unlikely outcome that is presented with a plausible cause (oil prices will rise, causing oil consumption to fall) than to the same outcome presented naked (oil consumption will fall).264 And people are willing to pay more for flight insurance against terrorism than for flight insurance against all causes.265 You can see where I’m going. The mental movie of an Islamist terrorist group buying a bomb on the black market or obtaining it from a rogue state and then detonating it in a populated area is all too easy to play in our mind’s eye. Even if it weren’t, the entertainment industry has played it for us in nuclear terrorist dramas like *True Lies, The Sum of All Fears,* and *24*. The narrative is so riveting that **we** are apt to **give it a higher probability than we would** if we thought through all the steps that would have to go right for the disaster to happen **and multiplied their probabilities**. That’s why so many of my survey respondents judged an Iran-sponsored nuclear terrorist attack to be more probable than a nuclear attack. The point is not that nuclear terrorism is impossible or even astronomically unlikely. It is just that the probability assigned to it by anyone but a methodical risk analyst is likely to be too high. What do I mean by “too high”? “With certainty” and “more probable than not” strike me as too high. The physicist Theodore Taylor declared in 1974 that by 1990 it would be too late to prevent terrorists from carrying out a nuclear attack.266 In 1995 the world’s foremost activist on the risks of nuclear terrorism, Graham Allison, wrote that under prevailing circumstances, a nuclear attack on American targets was likely before the decade was out.267 In 1998 the counterterrorism expert Richard Falkenrath wrote that “it is certain that more and more non-state actors will become capable of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons acquisition and use.”268 In 2003 UN ambassador John Negroponte judged that there was a “high probability” of an attack with a weapon of mass destruction within two years. And in 2007 the physicist Richard Garwin estimated that the chance of a nuclear terrorist attack was 20 percent per year, or about 50 percent by 2010 and almost 90 percent within a decade.269 Like television weather forecasters, the pundits, politicians, and terrorism **specialists have every incentive to emphasize the worst-case scenario**. It is undoubtedly wise to scare governments into taking extra measures to lock down weapons and fissile material and to monitor and infiltrate groups that might be tempted to acquire them. Overestimating the risk, then, is safer than underestimating it—though only up to a point, as the costly invasion of Iraq in search of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction proves. The professional reputations of experts have proven to be immune to predictions of disasters that never happen, while almost no one wants to take a chance at giving the all-clear and ending up with radioactive egg on his face.270 A few brave analysts, such as Mueller, John Parachini, and Michael Levi, have taken the chance by examining the disaster scenarios component by component.271 For starters, of the four so-called weapons of mass destruction, three are far less massively destructive than good old-fashioned explosives.272 Radiological or “dirty” bombs, which are conventional explosives wrapped in radioactive material (obtained, for example, from medical waste), would yield only minor and short-lived elevations of radiation, comparable to moving to a city at a higher altitude. Chemical weapons, unless they are released in an enclosed space like a subway (where they would still not do as much damage as conventional explosives), dissipate quickly, drift in the wind, and are broken down by sunlight. (Recall that poison gas was responsible for a tiny fraction of the casualties in World War I.) Biological weapons capable of causing epidemics would be prohibitively expensive to develop and deploy, as well as dangerous to the typically bungling amateur labs that would develop them. It’s no wonder that biological and chemical weapons, though far more accessible than nuclear ones, have been used in only three terrorist attacks in thirty years.273 In 1984 the Rajneeshee religious cult contaminated salad in the restaurants of an Oregon town with salmonella, sickening 751 people and killing none. In 1990 the Tamil Tigers were running low on ammunition while attacking a fort and opened up some chlorine cylinders they found in a nearby paper mill, injuring 60 and killing none before the gas wafted back over them and convinced them never to try it again. The Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo failed in ten attempts to use biological weapons before releasing sarin gas in the Tokyo subways, killing 12. A fourth attack, the 2001 anthrax mailings that killed 5 Americans in media and government offices, turned out to be a spree killing rather than an act of terrorism. It’s really only nuclear weapons that deserve the WMD acronym. Mueller and Parachini have fact-checked the various reports that terrorists got “just this close” to obtaining a nuclear bomb and found that all were apocryphal. **Reports of “interest**” in procuring weapons on a black market grew into accounts of actual negotiations, generic sketches morphed into detailed blueprints, **and flimsy clues** (like the aluminum tubes purchased in 2001 by Iraq) **were overinterpreted** as signs of a development program. Each of the pathways to nuclear terrorism, when examined carefully, turns out to have gantlets of improbabilities. There may have been a window of vulnerability in the safekeeping of nuclear weapons in Russia, but today most experts agree it has been closed, and that no loose nukes are being peddled in a nuclear bazaar. Stephen Younger, the former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos National Laboratory, has said, “Regardless of what is reported in the news, **all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously**.”274 Russia has an intense interest in keeping its weapons out of the hands of Chechen and other ethnic separatist groups, and Pakistan is just as worried about its archenemy Al Qaeda. And contrary to rumor, security experts consider the chance that Pakistan’s government and military command will fall under the control of Islamist extremists to be essentially nil.275 Nuclear weapons have complex interlocks designed to prevent unauthorized deployment, and most of them become “radioactive scrap metal” if they are not maintained.276 For these reasons, the forty-seven-nation Nuclear Security Summit convened by Barack Obama in 2010 to prevent nuclear terrorism concentrated on the security of fissile material, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, rather than on finished weapons. The dangers of filched fissile material are real, and the measures recommended at the summit are patently wise, responsible, and overdue. Still, one shouldn’t get so carried away by the image of garage nukes as to think they are inevitable or even extremely probable. The safeguards that are in place or will be soon will make fissile materials hard to steal or smuggle, and if they went missing, it would trigger an international manhunt. Fashioning a workable nuclear weapon requires precision engineering and fabrication techniques well beyond the capabilities of amateurs. The Gilmore commission, which advises the president and Congress on WMD terrorism, **called the challenge “Herculean**,” and Allison has described the weapons as “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.”277 Moreover, the path to getting the materials, experts, and facilities in place is mined with hazards of detection, betrayal, stings, blunders, and bad luck. In his book *On Nuclear Terrorism*, Levi laid out all the things that would have to go right for a terrorist nuclear attack to succeed, noting, “Murphy’s Law of Nuclear Terrorism: What can go wrong might go wrong.”278 Mueller counts twenty obstacles on the path and notes that even if a terrorist group had a fifty-fifty chance of clearing every one, **the aggregate odds of its success would be one in a million**. Levi brackets the range from the other end by estimating that even if the path were strewn with only ten obstacles, and the probability that each would be cleared was 80 percent, the aggregate odds of success facing a nuclear terrorist group would be one in ten. Those are not our odds of becoming victims. A terrorist group weighing its options, even with these overly optimistic guesstimates, might well conclude from the long odds that it would better off devoting its resources to projects with a higher chance of success. None of this, to repeat, means that nuclear terrorism is impossible, only that it is not, as so many people insist, imminent, inevitable, or highly probable.

#### Hegemony never existed – system is de-centralized, applying hegemonic mythology to policy causes blowback and destroys cooperation

Doran ‘9 (Charles F., Andrew W. Mellon Prof. of International Relations, Director of the Global Theory and History Program, Director of the Center for Canadian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U., “Fooling Oneself: The Mythology of Hegemony” International Studies Review, Vol. 11.1)

More than a catalogue of techniques other governments use to resist U.S. titular hegemony, this book informs an important question, long-debated, about the concept of hegemony. If the United States is a hegemon, why does a balance of power, composed of rivals that severely disagree with hegemonic domination, not form against the dominant United States? Building on the guidelines proposed by Wohlstetter (1964, 1968) and Elmore (1985) for the making of sound policy, namely, to see the world through the lens of the other so as to anticipate what others might conclude and do, the book critiques the very notion of hegemony. In this review, I argue from the perspective that the current conception of hegemony has **neither historical nor theoretical justification** (Doran 1991, pp. 117-121), and that many of the categories and examples assessed here bear witness to this reality. Joseph Nye (1990) distinguished between hegemony based on domination and control and a state carrying out a leadership role. Historically, as Doran (1971) argued, all military attempts at hegemonic domination in the central system **failed**; other members of the system rolled back these bids for hegemony forcefully, and the subsequent peace was neither designed nor governed (Ikenberry 1989; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Gaddis 2002) by any single state. Hegemony therefore involved *attempts* at centralized control, but never realized control. Instead, equilibrium among highly unequal states (Kissinger 2005) preserved the de-centralized nature of the international system (Vasquez 1993). Mearsheimer (2001) concurred that, as opposed to regions (Hurrell 2004) such as Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union or as opposed to the relationship between colonies and mother country (Mckeown 1983), hegemony in the central system never existed. The central international system is **pluralistic, de-centralized, and subject to the rules of balance**. Across long periods of history, **the structure of the system changes** as states follow their respective trajectories of relative power, reflecting their ability to carry out a variety of foreign policy roles. And at any point in time, states are located at highly unequal positions on these evolving power cycles. But a hegemon, a single all-powerful state, **has never dominated** and controlled; nor does it today; nor will it in the future. The United States is an “ordinary power” (Rosecrance 1976) like others, just more powerful, and, accordingly, more capable of providing certain leadership functions in the system. The choice of “global leadership” is far different from that of “global domination” (Brzezinski 2004). Failure to understand this reality has gotten the United States into the situation that is described in this book. The articles in *Hegemony Constrained* provide strong evidence in support of the claim that the reason a balance of power of disaffected states has not formed against the US is that, in other than defensive terms (Keohane 1984), **hegemony does not exist except in the minds of a few theorists** of international relations and influential advocates in policy circles. Not unexpectedly, other governments have discovered tactics to elude and to minimize the effect of such applications within US foreign policy. The excesses of application in the George W. Bush administration are the outcome of a mythology long in the making, extending from E.H. Carr’s extrapolation from British colonialism, and nurtured through American theorizing about the existence of a hegemon that dominates the system until a new rising state defeats and replaces the prior hegemon in a systems transforming war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996;Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdol-Lahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000). In the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarity, the belief that unipolarity meant such hegemony began affecting foreign policy decision-making and rhetoric during the Clinton administration (when America was proclaimed “the biggest bulldog on the block”). Quite in contrast is the argumentation of all prior administrations, going back to the Eisenhower administration, a time when America enjoyed greater relative power differentials (Pollins 1996) than those existing today. Yet, led by a groundswell of neo-conservative foreign policy thought (Krauthamer 1991;Mastanduno 1997; Wohlforth 1999; Kagan 2002; Barnett 2004), intellectual elites have so committed themselves to the hegemonic thesis that they have **blinded themselves to the consequences** of their own speculation. Should they be surprised when the “hierarchy” of international relations **turns out to be non-existent**, or the capacity to control even very weak and divided polities is met with frustration? Americans have invented a mythology of hegemonic domination that corresponds so poorly to the position they actually find themselves in that they **cannot comprehend the responses of other governments** to their actions. Bobrow and his fellow writers show the dozens of ways that other governments find to evade, and to subvert, the proscriptions and fulminations emanating from Washington. By creating a mythology of hegemony rather than learning to work with the (properly conceived) balance of power, the United States has **complicated its foreign policy** and vastly **raised the costs of its operation** (Brown et al. 2000; Brzezinski 2004). By destroying a secular, albeit brutal, Sunni Arab center of power in Iraq, the United States must now contend with a far greater problem (Fearon 2006) of itself having to hold the country together and to balance a resurgent Iran. Bogged down in Iraq, it is unable to deter aggression against allies elsewhere such as Georgia and the Ukraine, or to stop the growing Russian penetration of Latin America. By waving the flag of hegemony, the United States finds that very **few other governments see the need to assist it**, because hegemony is supposed to be self-financing, self-enforcing, and self-sufficient.

## 2NC – T and Energy K

### k ov

#### Social justice outweighs – structural violence is a proximate cause to war – psychologically ingrains genocidal tendencies into humanity which is the root of escalation in warfare – ethics demands a neg ballot

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “**little” violences** produced in the **structures**, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the **ease** with which humans are capable of **reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons** and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “**invisible” genocides** not because they are secreted away or **hidden from view**, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a **genocidal capacity** among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive **hypervigilance** to the less dramatic, **permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible** (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which **mass violence and genocide** are born, it is **ingrained** in the **common sense of everyday social life**. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “**priming**” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push **social consensus** toward **devaluing** certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Comparative evidence – focus on nuclear extinction is misplaced, has no scientific basis, and reifies imperialism

**Martin 84** – research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University

(Brian, “Extinction politics”, <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html>, dml)

By the 1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world's population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of 'overkill' - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several times over - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2] with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be 'limited' in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A 'limited' nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[6] The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7] There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement, the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10] But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades.

### at: jarvis

#### Jarvis is an idiot

**Shapiro 1** [Michael J Shapiro, Professor of Politial Science at the University of Hawaii. International Studies Association review of Books 2001 p. 126-128]

D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to what he calls "postmodernism," Jarvis presumes that he must defend traditional, neopositivist IR against (in the words of the book jacket) "the various postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of International Relations."To put the matter simply at the outset, Jarvis appears to be almost entirely ignorant of the philosophical predicates of the critical IR literature he attacks. He invents a model of thought that he finds vulnerable and then proceeds with his method of argumentation, mostly to scoff at the enemy he has invented. But Jarvis's scoffing amounts to whistling in the dark. He has entered a field of critique with predicates that are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about the consequences of critical work.The monster Jarvis creates is a work of fiction, for he begins with the presumption that postmodern orientations are "sweeping" and therefore threatening the discipline. (I estimate that roughly one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association reference postructuralist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian genre of G fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary roles—the monster and the victim—Jarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the Frankenstein monster an the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover othic d , Jarvis's overwrought style of characterization of the dangers of postmodern IR fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well. As is noted in Fred Botting's treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most threaten form ing " (p. 5).Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern" (which he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor, for most of his citations are not to postructuralist texts but to thinkers hostile to them) an elastic category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his pre-Kantian empiricism. It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that uses interpretive method. Although the use of a deconstructive mode of critique is extremely rare in international studies (the major practitioner is David Campbell), Jarvis frequently uses the term "deconstruction" as a synonym for postmodernist method. He assumes, without showing any evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of affirmation. T characterization is belied by Derrida's state-ments and demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war, security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression "structure of feeling" as a "postmod phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famous—though not sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent postmodernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory—in international studies or elsewhere—requires that the domains of theory and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a Foucauldian of discourse as event or a Deleuzian critique of representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory his ern treatment . Jarvis's view of the theory–data relationship was seriously impeached by enough neoempiricist philosophers by the 1960s to field a softball team (among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine, Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson).The critical work for which Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imagines to "the discipline," unless we construct the IR discipline as a trained inattention to the problematics, within which the work of theory proceeds. The writings of Michel Foucault (some whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a critical and affirmative perspective that does not compromise the kind of theory building that IR empiricists do. It of extends the arena—in which to theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivity—to regimes of discourse and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impositions of identity. Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contingent, explicable in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority, this does not thereby invalidate theory. Rather, it opens the way to work on the ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theorize with a sensitivity to theory's constituencies (beyond the policymakers that seem to be prized by Jarvis). As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowledge and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies, an important legacy of contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion. Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep resignation" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two sons. At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical fable crass and uninformed—like the rest of the book.

### at: owen

#### Owen is wrong – theory doesn’t kill relevance – need to ask epistemological questions to avoid policy failure – this card will win us the debate

**Reus-Smit 12** – Professor of International Relations at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy

(Christian, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2012 vol. 40 no. 3 525-540, dml)

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests **more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence**. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, **we lack any** credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are **not open epistemic or cognitive realms**, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry **may be a** necessary prerequisite **for the generation of practically relevant knowledge**. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend.

Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics **will remain at the far periphery of our vision**. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13

Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. **If** practical relevance **is one of our concerns**, however, there are several reasons why **this is misguided**.

Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on **the kinds of questions that animate our research**. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times **be most relevant** when we pursue questions that **policymakers and others would prefer left buried**. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves **asking questions of practice**; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that **political change is driven by material forces**, then **we are** unlikely **to see communicative practices** of argument and persuasion **as potentially successful sources of change**. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, **directly affecting the field’s practical relevance.**

Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, **directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant**. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance.

Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices **widely recognised as essential to good research**. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is **the importance of** metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then **being conscious of these assumptions** **is** necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off **questions of importance**, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us **being blind to things that matter**. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, **making it** practically relevant despite its abstraction.

### at: tech management good

#### lolsauce

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

## 1NR – Energy Production K

### at: perm

#### Second, we must use the right starting point – Only our starting point ensures equity—we should be citizens not consumers.

[GREEN]

Dubash and Williams 6—Navroz Dubash, IDFC Chair Professor of Governance and Public Policy @ Nat’l Inst. of Public Finance and Policy and James Williams, Lecturer Berkeley Energy and Resources Group [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 164]

To think of electricity as a social project means to acknowledge electricity's transformative potential and to recognize a substantial measure of intentionality in how it is directed. How societies define the role of electricity within a broader social vision, how they organize and manage the industry, and how they evaluate the trade-offs between different production and consumption choices in service of a social vision, are all proper subjects of deliberation. However, a robust and democratic decision-making process is a precondition for such debate. Governance of electricity is, therefore, the starting point of our exploration. In the discussion below, we argue that electricity reform narrows the exercise of collective public choice, by transforming the role of members of the public from citizen to consumer. This narrowing excludes consideration of important social objectives that deserve to be central to decision-making around electricity, particularly equity and the environment. There is a near total absence in the reform literature on the equity implications of the standard model. Yet, economic efficiency, the core objective of the standard model, often pulls in a quite different direction from equity. An explicit discussion of the trade-offs between the two is essential for a more complete and honest policy dialogue on electricity. Environmental implications too, are remarkably absent from the standard model, despite the enormous environmental footprint of the electricity sector. Any vision of a sustainable future can hardly afford to ignore the environmental consequences of electricity systems. Finally, electricity is not only important for national politics but is increasingly a factor on the global political stage. Electricity has implications for international cooperation and conflict through the upstream linkages of fuel supplies and, at the downstream end, through environmental impacts and growing international electricity trade. Yet, viewed through a financial and technical lens, the geopolitics of electricity reform are nearly invisible.

#### Permutation footnotes and coopts the alt – reaffirms the discoursive hegemony of the 1AC and prevents critical interrogaton of failed methods

[GREEN]

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

This perspective begins by seeing politics as a struggle for ‘**discursive hegemony’** in which actors seek to achieve ‘discursive closure’ by securing support for their definition of reality ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)). The notion of ‘**story-lines’** is useful here. These **narratives employ symbolic references that imply** a **common understanding of an issue** ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14); [Rydin, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib24)). Essentially, the assumption is that actors do not draw on a comprehensive discursive system; instead this is **evoked through story-lines**. By uttering a specific word or phrase, for example, ‘global warming’, **a whole story-line is in effect re-invoked**; one that is subtly different, for example, to that of the ‘anthropogenic greenhouse effect’ or ‘climate change’. ‘Global warming’ implies a story-line where the whole earth will get hotter in the future; ‘climate change’ suggests something less certain and uniform (see [Whitmarsh, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib33)); ‘anthropogenic greenhouse effect’ is perhaps the most technically correct term, and it directly attributes the warming effect to human activity. Story-lines are therefore much more than simply ‘arguments’. The meanings and connotations of familiar story-lines are often recognised at an almost **subconscious level**. They can thus act to **define policy problems while obscuring underpinning interests, values and beliefs.** They can add credibility to the claims of certain groups and render those of other groups less credible. They therefore act to create social order within a given domain by serving as devices through which actors are positioned and ideas defined and linked together. Institutional arrangements are important in structuring discourses, forming routine understandings. Complex research findings or logical arguments are often reduced to an eye-catching visual representation or **memorable one-liners**. These gloss over real complexities and uncertainties, and entail significant loss of meaning. This allows considerable flexibility in interpretation, which helps recruit people with differing views into a ‘**discourse coalition’**. It also **avoids confrontation** or even the necessity for direct social contact between coalition members ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)). In this view, to shape policy, **a new discourse** must **dominate** in public and policy discussions, **and penetrate the routines of policy practice** through institutionalisation within laws, regulations and organisations ([Hajer, 1993](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib13); [Nossiff, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib19); [Healey, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib16)). In terms of policy change then, **promoting a new story-line** is a difficult task, involving **dismantling** those promoted by those actors who were able to achieve prominence for their claims and viewpoint originally ([Rydin, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib24)) and which may have become **embedded in institutions**. For example, it took over a decade for the issue of acid rain to impact on UK air pollution policy. A discourse coalition formed around the issue that promoted a story-line highlighting the negative international environmental impacts of emissions from coal-fired power stations, particularly trees dying in Scandinavian countries, and the related need for tighter pollution controls in Europe. In the UK the acid rain discourse coalition first had to confront the institutionally entrenched British discourse on air pollution. This was dominated by local and national concerns with urban air pollution and health effects, which left little room for the consideration of new ideas related to the international environmental impacts of industrial emissions ([Hajer, 1995, p. 268](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)).

### at: fw

**Any middle ground of “weighing their aff” is illogical --- we are a critique of what happens in this debate, obviously, if you pit our agency versus the federal government, they will come out on top --- if debate is to get over its close-mindedness, it must learn to meet arguments on their own terms**

**Wise, 08** (Tim Wise, *White Like Me: Reflections on Race from a Privileged Son*, 2008, p kindle)

When we were on the negative side, I would argue, among other things, that poverty should be allowed to continue because it would eventually trigger a glorious socialist revolution (which isn't even good Marxist theory, let alone a morally acceptable position to put forward) , or that civil liberties should be eradicated so the United States could transition to a society in which resource use was limited by force, family size was strictly controlled, and thus planeta ry destruction was averted. The reason I call this process a white one is because whites (and especially affluent ones), much more so than folks of color, **have the luxury of looking at life or death issues** **of war, peace , famine, unemployment, or criminal justice as a game, as a mere exercise in intellectual and rhetorical banter**. For me to get up and debate, for example, whether or not full employment is a good idea, presupposes that my folks are not likely out of work as I go about the task. To debate whether racial profiling IS legitimate likewise presupposes that I, the Senator, am not likely to be someone who was confronted by the practice as my team drove to the Debate] tournament that day, or as we passed through security at the airport. In this way, competitive Debate reinforces whiteness and affluence as normative conditions , and makes the process far more attractive to affluent white students. Kids of color and working-class youth of all colors are simply not as likely to gravitate to an activity where pretty much half the time they'll be forced to take positions that, if implemented in the real world , might devastate their families and communities. Because Senators are encouraged to think about life or death matters as if they had little consequence beyond a given Debate round, the fact that those who have come through the activity go on to hold a disproportionate share of powerful political and legal positions-something about which the National Forensics League has long bragged- is a matter that should concern us all. Being primed to think of serious issues as abstractions increases the risk that the person who has been so primed will reduce everything to a brutal cost-benefit analysis, which rarely prioritizes the needs and interests of society's less powerful. Rather, it becomes easier at that point to support policies that benefit the haves at the expense of the have-nots, because the damage will be felt by others whom the ex-debaters never met and never had to take seriously. Unless debate is fundamentally transformed- and at this point the only forces for real change are the squads from Urban Debate Leagues who are clamoring for different styles of argumentation and different evidentiary standards- it will continue to serve as a staging ground for those whose interests are mostly the interests of the powerful. Until the voices of economically and racially marginalized persons are given equal weight in Debate rounds with those of affluent white experts (whose expertise is only presumed because other whites published what they had to say in the first place), the ideas that shape our world will continue to be those of the elite, no matter how destructive these ideas have proven to be for the vast majority of the planet's inhabitants. Until Debate is substantially diversified, so that previously ignored voices **will have a chance to be heard on their own terms, and in their own styles, little will change**. What Debate needs most IS an infusion of persons who because of their life experiences are almost guaranteed to be less naive; people who know full well that the system is anything but fair. Such persons have a right to be heard, and white, upper-middle-class, and affluent debaters need to hear them. They need to know how power works, and they will never gain an understanding of that by listening over and over to the voices of others like themselves. But Debate will never change in this way unless the gatekeepers of the activity are prepared to step up and demand it, not just with their words but with their actions, their money, their judging criteria, and even their ballots. Folks of color and working-class folks won't join an activity if they feel their wisdom isn't going to be taken seriously. If they wanted to be ignored, they would hardly need to get dressed up and travel to Debate tournaments in a hot van to do it. They could stay home and be ignored, because the powerful ignore them every day anyway. Understand, this is no mere ethical plea for inclusion. Continuing to ignore the v01ces of the marginalized carries great risks for us all, because it is precisely such persons who so often view the world differently and far more accurately than the privileged . As a case in point, the polls taken right before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 indicated broad white support for going to war, but almost nonexistent support among blacks. Most white folks were convinced not only of the war's moral legitimacy, but were sure that everything would go swimmingly, because other white people like Rumsfeld and Cheney said so. But black folks knew better. Those with privilege had the luxury of thinking they would be greeted as liberators. But black folks know that invaders rarely bring true freedom-they've been there, done that. For the sake of us all, and to slow down the rate at which blood 1S spilled across the globe, we desperately need to listen to those who live without the luxury of blinders.

#### Episodically framing the debate around the immediate enactment of an instrumental plan designed to respond to highly specific predictions degrades epistemological quality by prioritizing questions which can only be answered by the elite and privileged. This encourages ontological disempowerment, over-simplifies complex issues, and distracts attention from innovative analysis.

**London, 93** – journalist; Over the past decade, I've devoted much of my time to consulting with academic, government, and nonprofit leaders on issues involving social innovation and civic renewal. I’ve also led several national studies and research projects aimed at understanding how social innovators do their work, the power of informal networks, the uses (and misuses) of collaboration, and how communities transform and renew themselves. (Scott, *How the Media Frames Political Issues*, http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/frames.html)

Since electoral accountability is the foundation of representative democracy, the public must be able to establish who is responsible for social problems, Iyengar argues. Yet the news media systematically filter the issues and **deflect blame from the establishment** by framing the news as "**only a passing parade of specific events**, a 'context of no context.'" Television news is routinely reported in the form of specific events or particular cases — Iyengar calls this "episodic" news framing — as distinct from "thematic" coverage which places political issues and events in some general context. "Episodic framing," he says, "depicts concrete events that illustrate issues, while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence." Iyengar found that subjects shown episodic reports were less likely to consider society responsible for the event, and subjects shown thematic reports were less likely to consider individuals responsible. In one of the clearest demonstrations of this phenomenon, subjects who viewed stories about poverty that featured homeless or unemployed people (episodic framing) were much more likely to blame poverty on individual failings, such as laziness or low education, than were those who instead watched stories about high national rates of unemployment or poverty (thematic framing). Viewers of the thematic frames were more likely to attribute the causes and solutions to governmental policies and other factors beyond the victim's control. The preponderance of episodic frames in television news coverage provides a distorted portrayal of "recurring issues as unrelated events," according to Iyengar. This "**prevents the public from cumulating the evidence toward any logical, ultimate consequence**." Moreover, the practice simplifies "complex issues to the level of anecdotal evidence" and "encourages reasoning by resemblance — people settle upon causes and treatments that 'fit' the observed problems."

#### We are a pre-requisite to effectively deliberating over energy – they trap debate in the horizons of what elites have mapped out as worth debating

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

Linking our knowledge of social and ecological crises creates a basis for **an approach to energy that is** sociologically coherent **(recognizing** systemic injustices **and** power inequalities) and ecologically grounded. Recent work towards making such links may be found in systems ecology and in broader environmental sociological theory, in particular, the theory of the ecological rift, feminist ecology, and the environmental justice literature. Scholars from each of these latter perspectives have called for **more integrated theory in environmental sociology**, with greater attention given to the relationship between injustice and ecological degradation (Pellow 2000, 2007; Salleh 2009; Foster, York, and Clark 2010). Coming out of the natural sciences, systems ecologist and energy scholar Howard T. Odum also went to significant lengths to unite social and ecological science, with a focus on the urgent need for society at one and the same time to address environmental inequalities and restore the earth’s systems, disrupted as a result of capitalism’s growth (Odum 2007). Odum worked to overcome the nature/society dualism highlighted as a theoretical weakness in sociology by feminist ecologists, among others, by bringing economy and ecology under a unified ecological analysis. My goal is to put these theoretical developments in a context in which they can **complement one another and informs the ongoing development of the critical sociology of energy**.

The ecological rift: A framework for synthesis

Feminist ecologist Ariel Salleh (2010) highlighted that we remain in need of developing an integrated ecosocial analysis that recognizes the primary importance of “reproductive activities and regenerative provisioning” and includes “inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” (213, 215). Salleh sees the basis for an integrated theoretical approach in the ecological rift analysis emerging from Marxist sociology:

Climate change, biodiversity loss, and social precarity are each results of capitalist overproduction. In responding to this globalizing overshoot, **activists need a** materialist analysis **of social relations**, as well as a materialism that engages ecological processes. The dialectical tools of Marxist sociology already offer a basis for such a synthesis, but it remains a big ask for wider publics, because Eurocentric convention splits economics and ecology apart. (205)

The ecological rift framework, **which integrates** social**,** economic**, and** ecological **analysis, also puts** social justice **at its center**. Because it adopts an **openly emancipatory framework**, in ecological and social terms, it is an instance of “strong reflexivity” in theory, characterized by **a** critical distance **from the status quo that makes it possible to** question everything (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 305). This separates it from approaches characterized by what feminist standpoint theorists refer to as examples of “weak objectivity” that “attempt to separate the positive from the normative” (305). **Objectivity**, the way it is sometimes understood, **is** never possible **in this society** “because science is **a socially embedded and often an elitist activity**, such exclusion of values is impossible” (305). Not acknowledging this reality results in social science that **unreflexively adopts the master perspective, therefore often reflecting the** conceptual limits **of the dominant ideology**.

**Absent “strong reflexivity**” on the part of social science, **it is** impossible **to see the ways** in which “our ontological concepts of nature are often **bound to systems of oppression**” (305). Strong reflexivity in environmental social science demands adopting the vantage point of those deemed “Others” and a basis in critical ecology (306). Such reflexivity is at the heart of the ecological rift perspective. It thus builds on the best classical work and at the same time is **part of the development of critical approaches** in environmental sociology, such as critical human ecology, feminist ecology, and environmental justice, that break down disciplinary boundaries and make a contemporary, critical sociology of energy, with **energy justice** at its core, possible.

#### This is symptomatic of the fact that their framework makes it impossible to see the larger trends in knowledge production --- they are trapped within a cycle of catastrophic constructions

**Odekirk, 10** – debate coach (Scott, 8/6/10, *Impact Hyperbole: A Dilemma of Contemporary Debate Practice*, http://puttingthekindebate.com/2010/08/26/impact-hyperbole-a-dilemma-of-contemporary-debate-practice/)

It seems as though debate is stuck in a loop of nuclear wars and no value to life. We have a difficult time of conceiving of a terminal impact that doesn’t end in some ultimate destruction. Without terminal impacts such as nuclear war or the root of all claims, we have a tough time comparing and weighing impacts. Our arguments for spill over connect even the most improbable of scenario’s. Take for example our Africa war arguments. Given that Africa, as a continent, largely lack nuclear capabilities the chances of a conflict escalating in this area of the world are slim at best, but still debate returns to evidence written by The Rabid Tiger Project. In fact if you google “http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html”, you will find the great majority of the hits are debate links. This particular scenario is largely a debate creation and the scholarly world around it seems to have largely dismissed this single article as lacking credibility. Even in a debate context, this particular evidence is difficult to take seriously with a big debate on the line. Beyond the most terrible of impact evidence though, a world of equally terrifying scenario’s exist. According to the debate community, we face nuclear war because of any of the following: economic collapse in any number of countries across the globe, a lack of US leadership, use of US hard power (pre-emption, imperialist expansion, etc), India-Pakistan conflict, Middle East escalation, Iran nuclearization, capitalism, the lack of capitalism, patriarchy, racism, nuclear terrorism, US response to a terrorist attack, Taiwan independence, Chinese collapse, Russian aggression, Russian collapse, or accidental launch of nuclear weapons. That’s a short list and I am certain it doesn’t contain all the ways a nuclear war could break out as described in debate scenarios. **If one listened closely to the debate community, a sense of inevitable doom would most certainly replace any belief in a long life**. As much as it would seem I am poking fun at the policy debate community, kritik debaters caught in the same loop. External impacts to our criticisms are often extinction claims. A great number of K’s end in root of all claims or no value to life claims. In a very similar pattern, our kritiky impacts reflect the same sense of terminal destruction we find in the policy community we often subject to kritik. Possibly **living under the sword of Damocles has had more impact on our psyche** than Americans give it credit. Possibly living in the information age has resulted in the ability to read any old nut as great impact evidence without the effective critical thinking skills to discern who or what qualifies as credible. Possibly debate as a community lacks a language by which to communicate the dangers of racism, sexism, homophobia, economic justice, poor foreign relations, or terrorism. Is this tumble into impact hyperbole a problem? Well, it definitely does not reflect the sort of **care a scholar takes in his/her work**. It lacks the humility of limited claims backed only with probable warrants. Although there are some scenarios which could escalate into extinction or which do explain important pre-conditions for violence or meaningful living, these scenarios are much more limited than the debate community gives credence. In theory, the repetition of these hyperboles naturalize them or, at least, make them appear natural/normal. Our community **convinces itself** the impacts we discuss are credible threats. **We are a population believing in an exaggerated reality** – a hyper real if you will. Before we give ourselves the credit of knowing that our impacts are exaggerated, let us consider those of us who move on to work in think tanks or write law reviews who assess the threats of nuclear wars to the United States. In fact, this honor, think tank writer, is given out at the NDT every year. Perhaps a better question is, what is the value of our current impact debate? We don’t really help avoid nuclear wars or prevent violence by **making every possible interaction into a discussion of** the potential for either. If all of these scenarios result in gruesome **ending** for **life on Earth**, then the issues become very muddled. The result may be a sort of nihilism which in its conclusion is more Darwinian than Nietzsche. If we decide there is a impact hyperbole problem, what then is the alternative? Of course, the literature is our guide to a sensible form of impact debate, but we wouldn’t be in this predicament without literature. No debater asserts these impacts; they read cards. Cards = Truth Currency. A solution is a better internal link debate. How do the scenarios unfold? To examine the internals means examining all the many different ways the world would intervene in order to prevent the terminal impact from occurring. Debate **judges** can only work with what debaters give them, but we too **must be willing to tell a team their impacts are overblown** when this argument is part of the debate. Giving a debate ballot to the team who finds a 1% risk of extinction is a silly judging paradigm at best. At worst, it reflects a lack of critical thinking on the part of a debate critic. I am most definitely not saying critics should intervene and make impact arguments that are not in the debate, but giving more weight to impact defense is an important start to reign in our impact hyperbole.